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Abstract
We study eﬃciency and information aggregation in common value elections with con-
tinuous private signals and informative priors. We show that small elections are not
generally eﬃcient and that there are equilibria where some voters vote against their pri-
vate signal even if it provides useful information and abstention is allowed. This is not
the case in large elections, where the fraction of voters who vote against their private
signal tends to zero. In an experiment, we then study how informativeness of priors and
private signals impact eﬃciency and information aggregation in small elections. We ﬁnd
that there is a substantial amount of voting against the private signal. Moreover, while
most experimental elections are eﬃcient, we ﬁnd that it is not generally the case that
better private information leads to better decisions.
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1 Introduction
Consider a meeting of the executive board of a business where a decision by voting is due
as to which of two foreign markets to expand. All members of the executive board have
the same target, to increase the proﬁts of the business, yet they may have diﬀerent opinions
about which market will be best for their company. Assume all board members have access
to a report detailing which market is likely to be the most proﬁtable one. On top of that,
board members may have their own private information based on their past experience, their
discussions with other colleagues, etc. The question we ask in this paper is twofold: can it be
rational for board members to ignore their private information and vote following the report
even when private information is informative and abstention is allowed? Will the committee
arrive at the best possible decision given the information they have available?
To answer these questions we consider a common value election between two candidates
where voters are not perfectly informed about who is the best candidate. Instead, each voter
receives information about the identity of the best candidate from two sources, one public
and one private. The public source of information is a common prior shared by all voters.
The private source of information consists of an idiosyncratic signal of a certain quality, which
could for example reﬂect the voter’s expertise. Each voter knows the quality of his own signal
but not the quality of the signals others receive nor these signals themselves. In this setting it
may happen that some voters decide to abstain because they believe that their vote is going
to harm the chances of the best candidate winning the election. This is known as strategic
abstention (see for instance McMurray (2013) or Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)), which
can occur if the signal quality of these voters is low, so that they prefer leaving the decision
of selecting a candidate to other, possibly better informed, voters (self-selected experts). In
this paper we ask under which conditions a voter may even vote against his signal and what
are the implications of such behaviour for eﬃciency and information aggregation.
From our theoretical analysis we obtain three main results: ﬁrst, we ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant
amount of voting against the signal can be observed in equilibrium. Voting against the signal
can be rational if the voter deems the signal of too low quality compared to the information
contained in the asymmetric (and hence informative) prior. Second, we ﬁnd that voting
does not generally aggregate information eﬃciently (due to mis-coordination as a result of
equilibrium multiplicity). Still, eﬃcient equilibria can feature voting against the signal in
some cases. Third, for elections with a large number of voters we prove that the eﬀect of an
asymmetric common prior vanishes to zero and the election resembles one where the common
prior is non-informative.
Our analysis is closely related to McMurray (2013), who studies Condorcet (1785)’s classic
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common value environment with symmetric priors. The main diﬀerence between McMurray
(2013) and the present paper is that we allow for the common prior to be asymmetric: i.e. not
all candidates are equally likely to be the best one a priori. This gives rise to a phenomenon
not present in McMurray (2013): voters can vote against their own signal. With symmetric
priors any signal is at least as good as the prior in predicting the best candidate. This means
that no voter has incentives to vote against his signal and their decision then reduces to
whether to abstain or not. In our paper the fact that a signal may be less informative than
the common prior means that some voters will choose to vote against their private signal.
Contrary to previous literature (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996; Rivas and Rodr´ıguez-
A´lvarez, 2017), voting against the private signal is observed in a setting without biased
voters.
Our experiments test both the predictions of the symmetric case studied in McMurray
(2013) as well as the predictions of the asymmetric case introduced here for small elections.
As expected from the theoretical analysis, few voters (< 10%) vote against their signal with
uninformative (symmetric) priors, but 40 − 80%, depending on signal accuracy, do so in
the case with informative (asymmetric) priors. Turnout is higher in the asymmetric case
(83−86%) than in the symmetric case (78%) and slightly higher than theoretically expected.
The experiments deliver a surprising result in terms of eﬃciency. While, as expected, more
informative priors lead to higher eﬃciency, more informative signals do not always have this
eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, in the case of asymmetric priors more informative signals can lead to
lower eﬃciency. This is because in the asymmetric prior voters do not abstain enough and
do not react to signal quality enough, particularly when overall signal quality is high.
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and Meirowitz (2002) have previously studied common
value elections with continuous private signals. Both of these papers study a model where
abstention is not allowed and the unique symmetric equilibrium has voters voting for a certain
option if and only if their signal quality is past a certain threshold, otherwise they vote for the
other option. With abstention, a voter whose signal quality is not high enough may choose
to abstain and delegate the decision to other voters. Without abstention, this is not possible
and the voter is forced to choose between the two options. Thus, the fact that voters can
abstain makes the ﬁnding that voters may vote against their signal more robust. On top of
that, compared to Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and Meirowitz (2002), in our model with
abstention the symmetric equilibrium need not be unique and, in particular, it is possible to
ﬁnd parameter conﬁgurations such that there are two equilibria where in one equilibrium no
one votes against their private signal while in the other equilibrium there are some voters
who do.
Our research contributes to the literature on common value elections and strategic ab-
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stention. The classic paper of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) raised serious questions about
Condorcet’s implicit assumption that all voters will vote naively, i.e. vote as if they were the
only voter. They showed that voting against the signal can arise if abstention is not allowed
and all voters have the same signal quality. In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) voters are
of three types: partisans, fully informed and uninformed. Partisans support a certain can-
didate irrespective of the information available while fully informed and uninformed voters
prefer the best candidate. Fully informed voters know for certain who is the best candidate
while uninformed voters have no information about the best candidate other than the com-
mon prior. They show that a positive fraction of uninformed voters abstain even when they
strictly prefer one candidate over the other (swingers voter’s curse). Battaglini et al. (2010)
experimentally tested this model and found results in terms of eﬃciency, turnout and the
margin of victory that are in line with theory. We ﬁnd theoretically and experimentally that
being uninformed is not a requirement for the swingers voter’s curse (see also McMurray
(2013)). Indeed, the fact that voters posses information of diﬀerent qualities leads to a self
selection in abstention; those with lower quality signals abstain, even if their signal is more
informative than the prior, and even if based on the information they have they strictly prefer
one candidate over the other.
In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) voters receive information from diﬀerent sources,
where each source may provide information of diﬀerent qualities. However, they do not
allow for abstention, which is a crucial diﬀerence to our model. Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998) allow voters to abstain. However, all voters receive information of the same quality.
The reason why voters still do not always vote with their signal is that some voters are
biased towards one of the candidates which can induce others to vote against their signal
to compensate the bias. In our paper, no voter is biased and the driving force behind what
each voter chooses given his signal is the quality of the signal. Hence, while heterogeneous
preferences are key in their setting, heterogeneous quality of information is what drives our
results.
Also related to our paper is the work of Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007) who study
voters with homogeneous preferences and private signals of diﬀerent qualities. However, they
do not consider the possibility of abstention; their focus is on computing the best monotone
voting rule. Krishna and Morgan (2012) investigate the welfare eﬀects of introducing volun-
tary voting when all voters have the same signal quality. Oliveros (2013) presents a model
where voters can buy information of diﬀerent qualities and studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent
ideologies on information acquisition.
A technical diﬀerence between our paper and some of the previous theoretical literature
(McMurray (2013), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999) among others) is that we
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do not consider an uncertain number of voters, i.e. Poisson games (Myerson, 1998), to prove
our results. In elections with a small number of voters, as it is the case in the example in
our starting paragraph, this assumption may seem hard to justify. The fact that we do not
consider Poisson games does not lead to diﬀerent results when the number of voters is large.
In this case, our results mirror those of McMurray (2013).
Finally, our research also contributes to the experimental literature on the Condorcet Jury
paradigm. The ﬁrst published experiment on behaviour in voting games was conducted by
Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) who base their experiment on Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)’s
analysis of strategic voting with the unanimity rule. Closer to our setting are Battaglini et al.
(2008) and Battaglini et al. (2010) as described above, and also Morton and Tyran (2011)
who extend the setting in Battaglini et al. (2008) by exploring an environment where poorly
informed voters are not completely uninformed - they simply receive lower quality signals.
This can lead to equilibria where all voters vote and to equilibria where the poorly informed
voters abstain. However, as priors are symmetric, there should not be any voting against
the signal in this setting. Interestingly, Morton and Tyran (2011) found experimentally
that voters abstained more than what is optimal in this setting. Elbittar et al. (2017) found
experimentally in a common value election setting with an uninformative common prior, ﬁxed
signal quality and costly information acquisition that many voters vote instead of abstaining
even after choosing not to acquire information. In the symmetric treatments we ﬁnd that
behaviour is broadly in line with theory, but we ﬁnd that voters vote too often and do not
abstain enough in the asymmetric treatments. Kawamura and Vlaseros (2017) study a setting
without abstention, but where - in addition to private signals - voters also receive a public
signal (expert opinion). They ﬁnd that ineﬃciencies can arise in that setting due to voters
placing too much weight on the public relative to the private signal.
Studying experimentally whether participants would be willing to vote against their signal
when it is rational to do so raises interesting questions in itself. Violations of Bayesian
updating are widely documented in experimental research and there are two types of biases
which would lead to opposite results in terms of participants voting against their signal.
The well documented phenomenon of base-rate neglect (Kahnemann and Tversky (1972)
Grether (1980) and Erev et al. (2008)) will lead agents to overweight sample information and
hence would imply that voting against the signal is not commonly observed in the experiment.
However, there is also the opposing phenomenon of conservatism (Ward (1982)) which implies
that participants overweight the prior and hence would reinforce the strategic incentives to
vote against the signal. By studying for the ﬁrst time common value elections with informative
priors our experiment can shed some light on the role of these two opposing biases in strategic
voting.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and
present the main theoretical results. In section 3 we describe the design of the experiments
and present the experimental results. In section 4 present further theoretical results where
we consider the limit case then the number of voters grows large. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 The Model
Consider a setting where N + 1 ≥ 2 voters have to decide between candidate B(lue) or
candidate R(ed) by simultaneously casting a vote for either candidate or abstaining. The
candidate that receives most votes wins the election. In case of a tie each candidate wins
with equal probability.
Each voter derives one unit of utility if the candidate who wins coincides with the state of
nature and zero units of utility otherwise. The state of nature is a random variable s ∈ {B,R}
where without loss of generality we assume that the probability that the state is B is given
by p ≥ 12 .1 We restrict our attention to situations where p ∈
[
1
2 , 1
)
as if p = 1 then all
voters agree that B is the best candidate and thus will vote for him regardless on any other
information they may have available. The value of p is common knowledge and we refer to
it as the common prior.
Before the election, each voter i receives a signal σi ∈ {B,R} with quality qi ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
where
P (σi = s|s) = qi.
Given the state of nature, signals of diﬀerent voters are conditional independent. Both
the signal received by each voter as well as the quality of such signal are private information.
The distribution of signal qualities for each voter in the population is common knowledge,
identical, independently distributed and given by the strictly increasing cumulative density
function F :
[
1
2 , 1
] → [0, 1] and integrable probability density function f : [12 , 1] → R+.
Deﬁne the average signal quality as μ =
∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq and consider μ ∈ (12 , 1) to avoid the
trivial cases where all voters receive a useless signal or when all voters receive a perfectly
informative signal.
Thus, before the election each voter knows the common prior, his own signal and the
quality of such signal, as well as the distribution of the quality of other voters’ signals.
1The assumption p ≥ 1
2
is without loss of generality as if p < 1
2
then a relabeling of B to R and vice-versa
makes the analysis that follows still valid.
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However, he does not know the state of nature, the signals received by other voters, and the
quality of such signals.
A strategy for each voter is a map v : {B,R} × [12 , 1] → {∅, B,R} where v(σi, qi) is the
action of voter i who receives signal σi of quality qi, and ∅ stands for the action of abstaining.
Note that we focus on symmetric strategies: voters that are the same (same signal and
quality) behave the same. The fact that we only consider symmetric equilibria does not
undermine our main ﬁndings: if voting against the signal is possible in an equilibrium with
symmetric strategies then it is also possible in an equilibrium when asymmetric strategies
are considered.
Note that unlike most recent papers on voting and information sharing we do not assume
a Poisson distribution for the number of voters (see the seminal work by Myerson (1998) and
Myerson (2000) and more recent references by Myatt (2012) and Nunez (2010) among others).
This assumption is often employed given its technical conveniences, namely, independent
common public information and independence of actions. However, a drawback of assuming
a Poisson distribution for the number of voters is that voters are uncertain of how many other
voters there are in the population. While this seems a suitable assumption in large elections,
with small elections (committees, for example), which are the focus of this paper, it seems
unreasonable to assume that voters ignore how many other voters there are.
2.2 Analysis
When a voter decides whether to vote for B, R or to abstain, he compares the payoﬀ he
obtains under these three actions given the actions of all other voters. However, a voter can
inﬂuence his own payoﬀ only when his vote can change the outcome of the election (i.e. he
is pivotal). This can happen if and only if candidates B and R are at most one vote apart
when counting the votes of the other N voters. Thus, let πt(v, s) be the probability that
candidate B receives the same number of votes as candidate R (i.e. there is tie) when N
voters use strategy v and the state is s. Similarly, let πB(v, s) be the probability candidate B
receives exactly one vote less than candidate R when N voters use strategy v and the state
is s. Finally, let πR(v, s) be the probability candidate R receives exactly one vote less than
candidate B when N voters use strategy v and the state is s.
Before we write down the payoﬀ each voter obtains from playing the three diﬀerent actions,
it is useful to understand how likely each state is when a voter only considers his available
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information (i.e. ignoring strategic considerations). We have the following:
P (s = B|σi = B, qi) = pqi
pqi + (1− p)(1− qi) ,
P (s = R|σi = B, qi) = (1− p)(1− qi)
pqi + (1− p)(1− qi) ,
P (s = B|σi = R, qi) = p(1− qi)
p(1− qi) + (1− p)qi ,
P (s = R|σi = R, qi) = (1− p)qi
p(1− qi) + (1− p)qi .
Notice that the private signal of voter i is more informative than the prior, P (R|σi = R, qi) ≥
1
2 , if and only if qi ≥ p.
The expected utility voter i derives from voting for B compared to voting for R when the
other N voters use strategy v is then given by
ui(B,R, v) = P (s = B|σi, qi)
[
πt(v,B) +
1
2
πR(v,B) +
1
2
πB(v,B)
]
−P (s = R|σi, qi)
[
πt(v,R) +
1
2
πR(v,R) +
1
2
πB(v,R)
]
. (1)
In words, if the state is B then the increase in payoﬀ from voting B instead of R is: 1
if there is a tie when counting all other N votes (the best candidate wins), 12 if R is one
vote behind (the best candidate is chosen as opposed to forcing a tie), and 12 if B is one vote
behind (a tie is forced as opposed to not having the best candidate win). On the other hand,
if the state is R then the increase in payoﬀ from voting B instead of R is: −1 if there is a
tie when counting all other N votes (the best candidate does not win), −12 if R is one vote
behind (the best candidate is not chosen as opposed to forcing a tie), and −12 if B is one vote
behind (a tie is forced as opposed to having the best candidate win).
Similarly, the expected utility voter i derives from voting for B or R compared to ab-
staining when the other N voters use strategy v is given respectively by
ui(B, ∅, v) = P (s = B|σi, qi)
[
1
2
πt(v,B) +
1
2
πB(v,B)
]
−P (s = R|σi, qi)
[
1
2
πt(v,R) +
1
2
πB(v,R)
]
, (2)
ui(R, ∅, v) = P (s = R|σi, qi)
[
1
2
πt(v,R) +
1
2
πR(v,R)
]
−P (s = B|σi, qi)
[
1
2
πt(v,B) +
1
2
πR(v,B)
]
. (3)
To simplify the exposition, we assume that if voters are indiﬀerent between the two can-
didates they prefer the one that coincides with their signal. Similarly, if voters are indiﬀerent
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between voting for a certain candidate or abstaining, they follow their signal. As it will be
clear later on, the fact that f is integrable means that the probability that a voter is indiﬀer-
ent between two options (voting to one candidate or the other, or voting to either candidate
or abstaining) is zero. As such, the way indiﬀerence ties are broken has no eﬀect in our results
and it also allows us to ignore mixed strategies.
A voter votes for B if and only if ui(B,R, v) ≥ 0 and ui(B, ∅, v) ≥ 0. A voter abstains if
and only if ui(B, ∅, v) < 0 and ui(R, ∅, v) ≤ 0, and votes for R if and only if ui(B,R, v) < 0
and ui(R, ∅, v) > 0. Thus, expressions (1), (2) and (3) are what determines how a voter
behaves given how the other voters behave.
We have the following characterization of all symmetric equilibria (all mathematical proofs
are presented in the appendix):
Theorem 1. There exists an equilibrium. The equilibrium is either of two types:
- Type 1, characterized by two cutpoints 12 ≤ q−R ≤ q+R ≤ 1 with q−R ≤ p such that
v(σi, qi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
B if either σi = B or σi = R and qi < q
−
R ,
R if σi = R and qi ≥ q+R ,
∅ otherwise.
- Type 2, characterized by two cutpoints 12 ≤ q+B ≤ q+R ≤ 1 such that
v(σi, qi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
B if σi = B and qi ≥ q+B ,
R if σi = R and qi ≥ q+R ,
∅ otherwise.
In equilibrium of Type 1 all voters who receive signal B vote and they do so for candidate
B. These are the voters who receive a signal that agrees with the common prior. On the other
hand, voters who receive a signal against the common prior, i.e. signal R, behave as follows:
those with a low quality signal ignore their signal and vote according to the common prior,
those with a moderately informative signal abstain, and those with a suﬃciently informative
signal vote according to their signal.
In equilibrium of Type 2 no voter votes against his signal. Note that q+B ≤ q+R implies
that those voters who receive a signal that agrees with the common prior are less likely to
abstain than those who receive a signal against. This is the case because p ≥ 12 and, thus, if
a voter receives signal B the common prior makes him trust is signal more whereas if voter
receives signal R he is less convinced about candidate R than his signal quality suggests as
the common prior goes against R.
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The reason why there is not an equilibrium where voters who receive signal B vote for R
is that p ≥ 12 and, thus, a voter whose signal agrees with the common prior believes that B is
the best candidate so he either abstains or votes for B. Figures 1 and 2 present a graphical
representation of both types of equilibria.
Figure 1: Equilibrium of Type 1
σi = B
Vote for B
qi1
2
1
σi = R
Vote for B Abstain Vote for R
qi1
2
1q
−
R q
+
R
Figure 2: Equilibrium of Type 2
σi = B
Abstain Vote for B
qi1
2
1q
+
B
σi = R
Abstain Vote for R
qi1
2
1q
+
R
The expected fraction of voters who vote against their signal in equilibrium of Type 1 is
given by p
∫ q−R
1
2
(1−q)f(q)dq+(1−p) ∫ q−R1
2
qf(q)dq which, as we shall see with examples, can be
a strictly positive number. The fraction of voters who abstain is given by p
∫ q+R
q−R
(1−q)f(q)dq+
(1 − p) ∫ q+R
q−R
qf(q)dq in equilibrium of Type 1 and p
∫ q+R
1
2
(1 − q)f(q)dq + p ∫ q+B1
2
qf(q)dq + (1 −
p)
∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq + (1 − p) ∫ q+B1
2
(1 − q)f(q)dq in equilibrium of Type 2. This is the so-called
strategic abstention (and swing voters curse), found for instance in McMurray (2013) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996).
The reason why some voters vote against their signal is the following. Consider a very
simple example where there are only two voters. In this case a voter is always pivotal and
thus learns very little from the fact that he is pivotal (he still does learn some information, as
there are three diﬀerent possibilities for a voter to be pivotal). In this case if a voter receives
a low quality signal against the common prior, given that he does not learn much from being
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pivotal, he may still prefer to vote for what the common prior suggests if the common prior
is informative enough. This reasoning extends to more than just two voters. Assume that a
voter receives a low quality signal supporting the candidate that goes against the common
prior. If such voter is pivotal, he knows that there are mixed signals in the population, which
suggests that the common prior may be wrong. However, his information may still support
the same candidate as the common prior given that his updated belief stills put a signiﬁcant
probability on such candidate because the voter’s signal is of low quality. Thus, the voter
may have incentives to disobey his signal and vote against it.
The reason why strategic abstention is possible is that if a voter receives a signal of
moderate quality and the common prior is not very informative (or he receives a signal of
high quality against an informative the common prior, but not of suﬃciently high quality),
then if the voter is pivotal he may prefer to abstain and leave the decision to those who
are presumably better informed. This is because if the voter is pivotal there is a signiﬁcant
chance that the best candidate is ahead by one vote as opposed to the other candidate ahead
by one vote or there being a tie. Hence, by voting the voter runs the risk of contradicting
the opinion of most other voters who do not abstain and who have a better signal quality
than himself. In this situation the voter is better oﬀ by abstaining, even if he prefers one
candidate over the other, and leaving the decision of electing a candidate to the other more
informative voters.
Note that from the information revelation point, voting against the voter’s signal is worse
than abstaining. When a voter abstains he reveals that his signal is not very informative.
However, in an equilibrium where voters may vote against their signal, if a voter votes for B
it is not clear whether such voter received signal B or R. That is, voting against the signal
harms the chances of the best candidate winning the election more than abstention.
Theorem 1 states that in an equilibrium of Type 1, q−R ≤ p. Numerical examples show
that this inequality can be strict. If instead of a group of voters a single voter (dictator)
chose the winning candidate, straightforward calculations show that this voter will choose to
follow his signal if and only if his signal points at candidate B or if it points at candidate R
and the signal quality is at least p. In the language of the model, if N+1 = 1 then the unique
equilibrium is Type 1 with q−R = q
+
R = p. Thus, the fact that the group of voters includes
more than just one voter means that voters are less likely to vote against their signal. That
is, more voters means that each of them has more incentives to share their signal even if such
signal is of a quality lower than the prior. Later in the paper we show that the fraction of
voters who vote against their signal converges to zero as the number of voters increases to
inﬁnity.
As discussed in the introduction, McMurray (2013) considers a setting very similar to
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ours where the main diﬀerence is that he assumes p = 12 . The consequence of this is that in
his setting the only possible equilibria is Type 2 with q+B = q
+
R . The fact that p >
1
2 is what
allows the existence of an equilibrium of Type 1 with q−R >
1
2 and an equilibrium of Type 2
with q+B < q
+
R . The comparison of our results to McMurray (2013) is explored in more detail
later on when we consider elections with a large number of voters.
It is worth pointing out the similarities between our result in Theorem 1 and Proposition
1 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) (particularly striking is the resemblance between
ﬁgures 1 and 2 and ﬁgure 1 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)). However, both results
originate from very diﬀerent sources. In our paper, voters’ behavior depends on the signal
they receive, but also on the quality of such signal. In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998),
voters’ behavior depends on the signal they receive and on their and others’ bias towards each
of the candidates.2 Thus, the fact that unbiased voters receive signals of diﬀerent qualities
mimics the behavior observed when biased voters receive information of equal quality. A
fundamental diﬀerence between these two situations is that a voter who is biased takes such
bias as given while an unbiased voter is aware of the fact that his signal may or may not be
very accurate.
One may wonder if voters would still vote against their signal if information was endoge-
nous and costly, i.e. if voters have no private information but they can buy it (as in Persico
(2003) and Martinelli (2006)). In this case it can still happen that a voter buys information
that he then chooses to ignore. Consider a setting where voters have no private signals but
they can buy them. Say that the cost of buying a signal is ﬁxed and the quality of the signal
received is random (this is in between Persico (2003) where the quality is ﬁxed and Martinelli
(2006) where quality is contractible). In this case, in expected terms (ex-ante) having a signal
helps the voter make a better decision and thus he is willing to pay some cost for it, even if it
turns out that given the realization of the signal and its quality the voter chooses (ex-post) to
ignore his signal and vote following the common prior. This can be interpreted as the voter
paying a cost to search for information but only ﬁnding poor information that he chooses to
ignore.
2.2.1 Numerical Examples
Next we present some examples that illustrate the results of Theorem 1. In tables 1 and 2
we calculate the possible symmetric equilibria when there are 4 and 5 voters respectively and
signal qualities are distributed uniformly. The parameter constellations in table 1 are the
2In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) unbiased voters may also vote against their signal but only to oﬀset
the eﬀects of the vote of biased voters.
12
ones used in the experiments. Note that given the distribution of signal qualities in table 1
the symmetric equilibrium is unique and of type 1 for p = 0.95 and type 2 for p = 0.5.
Table 1: Equilibria, N + 1 = 4
p = 0.5, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.5, q ∼ U [12 , 34] p = 0.95, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.95, q ∼ U [12 , 34]
q+B = 0.67 q
+
B = 0.58 q
−
R = 0.54 q
−
R = 0.64
q+R = 0.67 q
+
R = 0.58 q
+
R = 0.86 q
+
R = 0.81
Table 2: Equilibria, N + 1 = 5
p = 0.5, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.8, q ∼ U [12 , 1] p = 0.95, q ∼ U [12 , 1]
q+B = 0.5 q
+
B = 0.68 q
+
B = 0.60 q
−
R = 0.59 q
+
B = 0.51 q
−
R = 0.68
q+R = 0.5 q
+
R = 0.68 q
+
R = 0.75 q
+
R = 0.59 q
+
R = 0.82 q
+
R = 0.68
Numerical results suggest that the equilibrium is unique if and only if N + 1 is even and
that if N + 1 is odd then there are exactly two equilibria. However, we have been unable
to prove this formally. The problem of uniqueness of equilibrium in voting models such as
this is far from trivial (McMurray, 2013) and is often ignored (Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1997, 1999)). Nevertheless, uniqueness of equilibrium is not necessary for our results.
Our characterization in Theorem 1 together with the examples above already illustrate one
of the points of this paper: the possibility for rational voters voting against their signal
when such signal is informative and abstention is allowed. On top of that, uniqueness of
equilibrium is also not required for the experimental results; we are not interested in making
point-wise prediction but in understanding whether the behavior of subjects responds the
way the theoretical results predict when we change the parameters of the model.
2.2.2 Eﬃciency
We say that an equilibrium strategy proﬁle is eﬃcient if the voting strategies maximize
the probability with which the best candidate wins the election. It is known from McLennan
(1998) that in symmetric common value elections, as its the case in this paper, the symmetric
strategy proﬁle that maximizes the probability with which the best candidate wins is an
equilibrium.3 The reason for this result is intuitive: if voters are playing according to the
strategy proﬁle that maximizes their payoﬀ then no voter has incentives to deviate as his
3In particular, McLennan (1998) states that the symmetric mixed strategy that maximizes voters utility is a
Nash equilibrium (Theorem 2). We do not need to worry about mixed strategies as no player is ever indiﬀerent
between voting for either option or abstaining. This is due to our assumption about the way indiﬀerence ties
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utility is already being maximized. Thus, if there are any eﬃciency losses in our model they
must come from equilibrium multiplicity.
Equilibrium multiplicity can cause ineﬃciencies as it presents voters with a coordination
problem. Further, as just discussed above, the strategy proﬁle that maximizes the probability
with which the best candidate wins is an equilibrium. Thus, if the equilibrium is unique then
it is eﬃcient for sure. However, with more than one equilibrium there is no guarantee that
all of them will be eﬃcient. The examples in Table 2 shed light about this issue. On the
one hand, the numerical example there tells us that the equilibrium may not be unique. On
the other hand, it can be calculated that if N + 1 = 5 and p = 0.8 then the probability with
which the best candidate wins is 0.92 in Equilibrium of Type 1 and 0.93 in the equilibrium
of Type 2. Numerical results show that this diﬀerence decreases with the number of voters.
Indeed, as we shall show in section 4.1, for elections with a large number of voters the best
candidate wins the election with probability one regardless of the equilibrium played.
Note also that it is not necessarily true that the equilibrium of Type 1, where some voters
vote against their signal, is ineﬃcient. As just discussed, if the equilibrium is unique then an
equilibrium with this property is eﬃcient. For example, according to Table 1 the equilibrium
with N + 1 = 4 and p = 0.95 is unique and of Type 2 both for q ∼ U [12 , 1] and q ∼ U [12 , 34 ] ,
which means that this equilibrium is eﬃcient.
2.3 Testable Predictions and Empirical Questions
In this section we describe some key qualitative properties that we are interested in testing
in the laboratory. One of the new ﬁndings in this paper is that, unlike in the symmetric
prior case studied in McMurray (2013), participants may vote against their signal if it is not
accurate enough. We ask the following question:
Voting against one’s signal How is the propensity to vote against the signal aﬀected by
changes in the prior p and the signal accuracy q?
From theory we would expect to see voting against the prior only if priors are asymmetric
and if signal accuracy is “low enough”. Empirically, whether this prediction holds depends
crucially on how people update their prior on the basis of the information they received.
Two diﬀerent failures of Bayesian updating have been robustly documented in the literature:
(i) base-rate neglect, which leads to overweighing sampled information (Kahnemann and
are broken. Note also that only voters with a particular signal quality will be indiﬀerent between more than
one action and given the continuous distribution of signal qualities the probability of a voter having such
particular signal quality is zero.
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Tversky (1972), Grether (1980) and Erev et al. (2008)) and (ii) conservatism, which leads to
underweighing or even ignoring the sample (Ward (1982)).
Base rate neglect is not important if priors are symmetric (p = 0.5). With asymmetric
priors, however, it could potentially play an important role. Under base-rate neglect partici-
pants would vote with their signal more often, leading to possibly worse outcomes in terms of
the eﬃciency of the majority decision. Conservatism would lead to the opposite prediction.
Participants would vote with the prior too often leading to worse information aggregation
and lower eﬃciency. Hence, while theory might be a good predictor of behavior for symmetric
priors, its predictive accuracy could be far worse in the case of asymmetric priors if base-rate
neglect or conservatism play important roles in this setting. If participants vote too often or
too seldom against their signal, information aggregation and eﬃciency are impacted as well.
We hence ask:
Eﬃciency How is the eﬃciency of voting outcomes aﬀected by changes in the prior p and
the signal accuracy q?
We would expect eﬃciency to increase both as priors become more asymmetric (hence
containing more information) and as signals become more accurate. However, in the presence
of biases, such as base-rate neglect or conservatism, this may not necessarily be the case. Our
experiments will provide an empirical test of how the symmetric and asymmetric settings
diﬀer with regard to these issues and how potential biases aﬀect the explanatory power of
the theory in both these two settings.
3 Experiments
3.1 Design of the Experiments
Our experiment implements the setting described in the theoretical section for N+1 = 4, i.e.
four voters. In all treatments participants played a voting game for 30 rounds. After each
round they were randomly re-matched in a new group of four voters. Each round proceeded
as follows. First, participants were reminded of the value of p illustrated by a wheel as shown
in the Instructions in Appendix B. They were then shown their private signal and informed
about the accuracy of their signal qi. Figure 7 in Appendix C shows a screenshot of how the
signal and signal quality were communicated in the experiment. They were afterwards asked
to vote for either RED, BLUE or to ABSTAIN, where the order of the ﬁrst two options was
randomized. At the end of each round they were informed about their own vote, the majority
vote in the group, the realized state and their payoﬀ. Participants received 10 experimental
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tokens if the majority vote matched the state and 2 tokens if it did not. At the end of the
experiment one round was randomly drawn and participants were paid for that round only
plus a show up fee of 3 tokens. Tokens were converted into GBP at a rate of 1:1.
To answer our questions regarding information revelation and eﬃciency we systematically
vary p and q. Treatment SYM implements the symmetric setting analyzed by McMurray
(2013). Both states are equally likely and signal accuracy is drawn from [0.5, 1], where in
the experiment we only used multiples of 0.1.4 In SYM-COARSE the prior is also 0.5,
but signal accuracy is now distributed in [0.5, 0.75] and represented in multiples of 0.05.
In treatment ASYM an asymmetric prior of 0.95 is implemented. Treatment ASYM-
COARSE coincides with treatment ASYM, but the signal accuracy q is again lower and
drawn from [0.5, 0.75]. In each treatment we had 48 participants organized in six matching
groups (clusters) of size 8. The exception is treatment ASYM-COARSE, where due to low
show-up, we had 44 participants only. Theoretical predictions for these diﬀerent treatments
can be found in Section 2.2.1 in Table 1.
The experiments were conducted in May 2015 and September 2016 at EssexLab at the
University of Essex. Written instructions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment
and can be found in Appendix B. Before starting the experiment participants had to answer
six control questions checking their understanding of the instructions. These questions can
also be found in Appendix B. Participants earned either 13 GBP or 5 GBP depending on
whether, in the round randomly drawn for payment, the majority vote matched the state or
not.5 The experiment lasted around 45min, it was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and participants were recruited using hroot.
3.2 Experimental Results
This section contains our experimental results. We study individual behaviour in Section
3.2.1, what consequences it has for aggregate outcomes in Section 3.2.2, and ﬁnally we discuss
learning heuristics in Section 3.2.3.
4The reason that we did not allow any number, like e.g. 0.61475368, is (i) that it is diﬃcult and potentially
confusing for participants to communicate a smaller grid visually and (ii) that we deemed it extremely unlikely
that there would be substantial behaviour diﬀerences between such a number and the closest multiple of 0.1,
i.e. 0.6.
5In May 2015, 13 GBP equalled about 20.50 US dollars and 5 GBP around 7.90 US dollars. In September
2016, 13 GBP equalled about 17.91 US dollars.
16
3.2.1 Individual Behaviour
Table 3 gives a ﬁrst overview of individual voting behaviour. It shows the distribution of
votes depending on state and signal received for the four diﬀerent treatments.
Symmetric treatments We start by discussing the treatments with a symmetric prior
SYM and SYM-COARSE. In treatment SYM participants abstain ≈ 28% of the time
(15 − 35% depending on state and signal). Given that (i) according to the symmetric equi-
librium described in Table 1 voters should abstain if their signal accuracy is below 0.67 and
(ii) signals are uniformly distributed in [0.5, 1] we would theoretically expect participants
to abstain around 34% of the time. Subjects behaviour is thus roughly in line with these
predictions. We also see around 10% of voting against the signal which we should not see
theoretically. We discuss possible explanations for this in more detail in Section 3.2.3. In
treatment SYM-COARSE we see around 10− 17% abstentions which is again in line with
theoretical expectations (16%, see Table 1). We also see around 25% of participants voting
against their signal, which is surprisingly high in this treatment.
if state is RED
SYM SYM-COARSE ASYM ASYM-COARSE
σ RED BLUE RED BLUE RED BLUE RED BLUE
(0.72) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62) (0.71) (0.64) (0.61) (0.65)
RED 0.61 0.09 0.59 0.34 0.10 0 0.26 0.24
BLUE 0.08 0.58 0.29 0.55 0.55 1 0.63 0.66
abstain 0.31 0.35 0.12 0.12 0.36 0 0.11 0.10
if state is BLUE
SYM SYM-COARSE ASYM ASYM-COARSE
σ RED BLUE RED BLUE RED BLUE RED BLUE
(0.64) (0.73) (0.58) (0.63) (0.63) (0.73) (0.58) (0.63)
RED 0.51 0.08 0.59 0.25 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.06
BLUE 0.23 0.77 0.24 0.66 0.56 0.92 0.65 0.83
abstain 0.26 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.06 0.20 0.11
Table 3: Vote distribution (share of participants voting RED, BLUE or abstaining) depend-
ing on state and signal received (average signal accuracy in brackets) for the four diﬀerent
treatments. Note that participants do not know the state, but average signal quality depends
on the state.
Two previous experiments studied a related common value election setting with a sym-
metric common prior (p = 0.5). Elbittar et al. (2017) found experimentally with ﬁxed signal
quality and costly information acquisition that voters tend to vote too often instead of ab-
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staining given the information they have available. In particular, they found that a signiﬁcant
proportion of subjects vote when they have no information at all on what is the best alter-
native. The authors suggest subjective priors as a possible explanation for this; each voter
believes that with some probability other voters may be biased and vote for a particular
option when they have no information available. This leads to voters with no information to
vote simply to oﬀset the eﬀect of these biased voters. By contrast, Morton and Tyran (2011)
found experimentally in a setting with symmetric common prior and two diﬀerent qualities of
information that voters abstained more than what was optimal. In our symmetric treatments
the share of participants abstaining is in line with theoretical predictions.
Figure 3 illustrates how voters with RED (top left panel) and BLUE (top right panel)
signals vote in treatment SYM. As expected, we don’t see substantial diﬀerences between the
two cases. Irrespective of the signal received, only few participants vote against their signal.
The share of abstentions is high (around 45%) if the signal is uninformative and decreases
sharply around q ≈ 0.6 in line with theoretical predictions. Also the share of participants
voting against their signal decreases from about 15−20% for uninformative signals to 5−10%
with very informative signals. While the former could be attributed to subjective priors, as
in Elbittar et al. (2017), the latter is likely due to mistakes. The two bottom panels focus on
SYM-COARSE. Here we see much fewer abstentions (≈ 20%) if the signal is uninformative.
Furthermore, this frequency does not decrease by much over the [0.5,0.75] range of accuracies.
Participants in this treatment, hence, react less to signal quality compared to SYM.
Asymmetric treatments In treatment ASYM we see that if the signal is BLUE, i.e.
consistent with the prior, virtually all participants vote BLUE in line with theoretical pre-
dictions (Table 3). If the signal is RED, around 55% of participants vote against the signal
and around 30% abstain. Theoretically we should only expect 10% of voting against the
signal (Table 1). By contrast, we would expect 64% percent of abstentions. Hence, not only
do participants vote against their signal, they even do so excessively at least compared to
theoretical predictions. One reason they might do so is the use of simple heuristics as we
discuss in Section 3.2.3. In ASYM-COARSE participants vote ≈ 65% of the time against
a RED signal, which is in line with the 60% theoretically expected in this treatment and
abstain around 15% of the time (compared to 40% expected theoretically, see Table 1).
Hence, as expected, participants vote against their signal more often with asymmetric
priors. Higher signal accuracy reduces the frequency with which this occurs, but by not as
much as we would expect. Compared to the symmetric equilibrium described in Table 1, too
many participants vote against their signal in ASYM and too many participants vote with
their signal in ASYM-COARSE. To assess how important these diﬀerences are we next
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explore in more depth how voting changes with signal accuracy.
(a) RED signal SYM (b) BLUE signal SYM
(c) RED signal SYM-COARSE (d) BLUE signal SYM-COARSE
Figure 3: The ﬁgure shows the vote distribution (red, abstain, blue) conditional on signal
accuracy as well as theoretical threshold (vertical line). Mean share of participants voting
with/against signal or abstaining averaged for bands of accuracy of length 0.1 (a,b) or 0.05
(c,d). Treatments SYM and SYM-COARSE.
In treatment ASYM (top panels Figure 4) participants who receive a BLUE signal es-
sentially always vote BLUE (panel (b)). There is some abstention for low signal accuracy
(below 0.65) and a few votes for RED. Conditional on receiving a RED signal the majority of
participants do not vote RED (between 90% if q = 0.5 and around 70% if q > 0.9). Around
50−60% of participants vote against their signal, i.e. vote BLUE when their signal was RED.
This share is pretty stable across levels of accuracy q. The share of participants abstaining
is around 30%. Hence, participants with a RED signal vote according to their signal too
much if signal accuracy is low and too little if signal accuracy is high. Rather than a general
tendency towards conservatism or base-rate neglect we ﬁnd that participants do not react
enough to the accuracy of their signal. The bottom panels show the analogous graph for
treatment ASYM-COARSE, where signals are less accurate. Behavior conditional on a
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(a) RED signal ASYM (b) BLUE signal ASYM
(c) RED signal ASYM-COARSE (d) BLUE signal ASYM-COARSE
Figure 4: The ﬁgure shows the vote distribution (red, abstain, blue) conditional on signal
accuracy as well as theoretical thresholds (vertical lines). Mean share of participants voting
with/against signal or abstaining averaged for bands of accuracy of length 0.1 (a,b) or 0.05
(c,d). Treatments ASYM and ASYM-COARSE.
BLUE signal is very similar to treatment ASYM with most participants voting BLUE. Con-
ditional on receiving a RED signal, participants are now more likely to vote against the signal
with almost 70% voting BLUE if q = 0.5, i.e. if the signal is uninformative. The percentage
shrinks for higher levels of q, but remains substantial at 60% even if q = 0.75.
Table 7 in Appendix C shows the result of a multinomial logit regression of voting out-
comes (categorized as “voting with the signal”, “abstaining” or “voting against the signal”)
on signal accuracy separately for the case where a RED (columns (1)-(4)) or a BLUE (columns
(5)-(6)) signal was received. The baseline category is to vote with the signal.6
Participants in treatments SYM and SYM-COARSE are increasingly likely to vote
with their signal compared to abstaining or voting against it as the signal accuracy increases.
6Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix C show OLS regressions on binary outcomes of “Abstention” and “Voting
against the signal”, respectively.
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In treatment ASYM this is only true when the signal is in line with the prior, i.e. BLUE.
If participants in these treatments receive a RED signal, by contrast, they become more
likely to abstain compared to voting with (or against) the signal as signal accuracy increases.
One intuition could be that participants do predominantly vote against the signal in these
treatments when signal quality is low, while they resolve the tension between a high signal
accuracy on the one hand and a strong prior against it on the other hand by abstaining.
This leads to relatively more abstentions as signal accuracy increases. Interestingly, Figure
4 reveals that the mean positive eﬀect of q on abstention is mostly driven by a comparison
of “medium levels” of accuracy with “high” levels of accuracy, while the highest number of
abstentions can still be found for very low levels of accuracy also in this treatment. Table 8
in Appendix C, which controls for the number of times a participant saw a red signal, shows
qualitatively the same results.
To sum up, voting behaviour in the experiment is largely in line with what we expected
from theory. Participants are not hesitant to vote against their signal if its quality is low.
They even do so excessively in treatment ASYM. Furthermore, they do not react enough to
signal accuracy.
Result 1 In line with theoretical predictions, participants in the asymmetric prior treatments
vote against their signal if signal quality is low. They do, however, not react enough to
signal quality i.e. do not vote enough against the signal if quality is low and too often
when signal quality is high.
3.2.2 Eﬃciency
We next assess the impact of voting behaviour on aggregate outcomes, in particular on the
eﬃciency of voting outcomes. We would expect eﬃciency to increase both as priors become
more asymmetric (hence containing more information) and as signals become more accurate.
In terms of our treatments we would hence expect higher eﬃciency in ASYM compared to
SYM and higher eﬃciency inASYM compared toASYM-COARSE as well as SYM com-
pared to SYM-COARSE.
Figure 5 shows eﬃciency over time across the three treatments. As expected, eﬃciency
is higher in ASYM compared to SYM, even though the gap is narrowing over time, as
eﬃciency in SYM is steadily increasing. Eﬃciency in ASYM-COARSE is substantially
higher compared to SYM-COARSE. A more asymmetric prior clearly increases eﬃciency.
The picture is less clear-cut when it comes to the eﬀect of signal accuracy. Under sym-
metric priors the eﬀect is as we expected. Higher signal accuracy in SYM leads to higher eﬃ-
ciency compared to SYM-COARSE. The diﬀerence appears for both states with outcomes
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Figure 5: Eﬃciency: percentage of time the majority vote agreed with the state over time
across the four treatments as well as benchmark based on the symmetric or asymmetric prior,
respectively.
in SYM being around 10% (13%) more eﬃcient than outcomes in SYM-COARSE when
the state is BLUE (RED). Interestingly, the diﬀerence appears only after some learning has
taken place, i.e. after the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds (see also Table 4).
Under asymmetric priors, by contrast, the eﬀect is not as expected with no diﬀerence
in eﬃciency across the two treatments overall. While across the ﬁrst ﬁve periods eﬃ-
ciency is higher in ASYM this eﬀect reverses over time, as eﬃciency increases in ASYM-
COARSE, but not in ASYM. By the last ﬁve periods there is a substantial and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two treatments with ≈ 14% more eﬃciency in
ASYM-COARSE compared to ASYM (column (3) in Table 4). Table 11 in the Ap-
pendix additionally explores linear time trends and shows that those are statistically diﬀer-
ent in ASYM compared to ASYM-COARSE. Above, we have seen above that voters in
ASYM vote against their signal too much and do not abstain enough. Furthermore, voters
in ASYM do not react to signal quality enough, i.e. vote against their signal even when
signal quality is very high. Voters in ASYM-COARSE still do make this mistake, but to
a lesser extent, possibly because the lower signal quality makes them less conﬁdent. The
fact that average eﬃciency in the second half of the experiment is only reduced by 4% (in
ASYM compared to ASYM-COARSE) when the state is BLUE, while it is reduced by
≈ 16% when the state is RED, suggests that this type of mistakes could be the underlying
reason for why signal accuracy does not increase eﬃciency with asymmetric priors.
Result 2 Higher signal accuracy increases the eﬃciency of voting outcomes in the symmet-
ric case, but not in the asymmetric case. Across the last 5 rounds of the experiment
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All periods periods 1-5 periods 26-30
SYM-COARSE(β1) -0.118*** -0.041 -0.108**
(0.027) (0.060) (0.050)
ASYM(β2) 0.218*** 0.338*** 0.041**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
ASYM-COARSE(β3) 0.201*** 0.178** 0.188***
(0.039) (0.079) (0.017)
Constant 0.709*** 0.612*** 0.771***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.017)
β2 − β3 0.017 0.160* -0.146***
p-value 0.6671 0.0688 <0.0001
Observations 5,640 940 940
Participants 188 188 188
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Random eﬀects OLS regression of eﬃciency on treatment dummies. Standard errors
are clustered at the matching group level.
eﬃciency is even higher in ASYM-COARSE compared to ASYM.
How eﬃcient are voting outcomes compared to theoretical benchmarks? There are at least
three benchmarks one could consider. The ﬁrst is the probability of choosing the best candi-
date if only the common prior was available, which is 0.5 in SYM and SYM-COARSE and
0.95 in ASYM and ASYM-COARSE. Figure 5 shows that with a symmetric prior, partic-
ipants signiﬁcantly outperform the common prior benchmark, while in ASYM and ASYM-
COARSE participants cannot improve on the common prior on average. It should be noted,
however, even if voters played the symmetric strategy equilibrium, which as discussed in sec-
tion 2.2.2 is the strategy proﬁle that maximizes the chances of choosing the best candidate,
they will barely do any better than in the common prior benchmark. In this respect, eﬃciency
in the asymmetric prior treatments seems in line with the common prior benchmark.
A second benchmark could be the ex-ante (i.e. before signals and qualities are realized)
probability of choosing the best candidate when the symmetric equilibrium (calculated in Ta-
ble 1) is played. Under this benchmark the expected probability with which the best candidate
wins the election is given by 0.88 in SYM, 0.71 in SYM-COARSE, 0.97 in ASYM and
0.95 in ASYM-COARSE.7 Empirically, eﬃciency in SYM and SYM-COARSE is below
these levels. Thus, while information from private signals is used somewhat eﬀectively in
7In treatment ASYM-COARSE signal qualities are so low compared to the quality of the common prior
that there is barely any gain in eﬃciently using private signals when compared to just voting the common
prior.
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treatments SYM and SYM-COARSE, as the probability of choosing the right candidate
is higher than 50%, it is used less eﬀectively than what the theory suggests.
The third benchmark asks how much eﬃciency could be obtained if all private information
was perfectly aggregated, i.e. if all signals and qualities were observed by all voters. To this
end, given the set of signals and qualities for all voters (σi, qi)
N+1
i=1 we ﬁrst compute the
probability that the state is Blue:
P (s = B|(σi, qi)N+1i=1 ) =
pΠN+1i=1 (1σi=Bqi+1σi=R(1−qi))
pΠN+1i=1 (1σi=Bqi+1σi=R(1−qi))+(1−p)ΠN+1i=1 (1σi=Bqi+1σi=R(1−qi))
.
Second, we have that Blue is the most likely state of nature given all private signals and
qualities if and only if P (s = B|(σi, qi)N+1i=1 ) ≥ 12 . Thus, the probability of choosing the best
candidate given all private signals and their qualities is max{P (s = B|(σi, qi)N+1i=1 ), 1−P (s =
B|(σi, qi)N+1i=1 )}. This benchmark delivers even higher probabilities of choosing the right can-
didate on average across all 30 rounds (between 0.94 in SYM and 0.98 in ASYM). In sum,
participants in the symmetric treatments use information eﬀectively enough to substantially
outperform the prior, but information aggregation is not perfect. In the asymmetric treat-
ments participants do not outperform the (very high) prior substantially.
3.2.3 Heuristics
So far we have taken an equilibrium perspective. In this Section we brieﬂy explore some
heuristics participants might use in the experiment. Speciﬁcally, we focus on how participants
learn from feedback and in particular from three statistics: (i) whether the majority vote in
the past period was incorrect (i.e. not coinciding with the state), (ii) whether participant i’s
vote was incorrect and (iii) whether participant i was pivotal and incorrect. We ask what
eﬀect these statistics have on abstention as well as on switching behaviour, i.e. the propensity
to switch vote across rounds.
Table 5 shows the results for the symmetric prior treatments. In SYM none of these
statistics matter for abstention and switching. As predicted by theory, abstention is mostly
determined by the signal accuracy q, but none of the other variables do seem to matter. This
changes in treatment SYM-COARSE. Here participants seem to rely somewhat more on
heuristics. Again, signal accuracy predicts abstention, but now also whether agent i’s vote
herself was correct does matter. If they were wrong in the past period participants in SYM-
COARSE are more likely to abstain subsequently. Whether or not the mistake happened
in a pivotal position does not seem to matter.
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Symmetric Prior treatments
SYM SYM-COARSE
Abstention Switching Abstention Switching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
q -1.147*** -1.146*** -0.071 -0.070 -0.737*** -0.738*** -0.143 -0.145
(0.071) (0.071) (0.092) (0.092) (0.111) (0.111) (0.178) (0.178)
Majority wrongt−1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0036 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
i wrongt−1 -0.008 0.013 -0.024 -0.005 0.056** 0.058** -0.098 -0.091
(0.017) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.055) (0.073)
i (pivotal∧wrong)t−1 -0.037 -0.032 -0.004 -0.012
(0.044) (0.029) (0.037) (0.047)
Constant 0.992*** 0.992*** 0.636*** 0.636*** 0.518** 0.518** 0.670*** 0.670***
(0.140) (0.140) (0.046) (0.046) (0.148) (0.147) (0.118) (0.117)
Observations 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392
R-squared 0.159 0.160 0.002 0.002 0.039 0.039 0.010 0.010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Simple Heuristics in Symmetric Prior treatment. Abstention and Switching regressed
on signal accuracy and three dummies indicating whether (i) the majority vote in the past
period was incorrect (i.e. not coinciding with the state), (ii) participant i’s vote was incorrect
and (iii) whether participant i was pivotal and incorrect.
Table 6 shows the results for the asymmetric prior treatments. While abstention decreases
again with signal accuracy, as expected, participants in the asymmetric treatments also seem
to rely a great deal on their experience from the previous period. Having voted wrongly makes
participants more likely to abstain or to switch (in any way between RED, BLUE or Abstain)
in the period immediately after. The eﬀect on switching is particularly strong if participants
have been wrong and pivotal in the immediately preceding period. Interestingly, having
been wrong and pivotal makes participants less likely to abstain in the subsequent period
in ASYM-COARSE. Note also that in the case of switching the R2 in the asymmetric
regressions is almost ten times higher than in the corresponding symmetric treatments.8
Table 12 in Appendix C additionally controls for the number of times a participant saw a
RED signal with qualitatively the same results.
To sum up, participants in the asymmetric prior treatments seem to try and learn from
past experience to a much greater extent than participants in the symmetric treatments.
One reason could be that the asymmetric environment with two diﬀerent and sometimes
conﬂicting pieces of information about the state (the prior and the signal) seems more diﬃcult
8There is no clear ranking of R2 in the case of abstention. While past experience explains more of the
variation in the asymmetric treatments, signal accuracy explains more in the symmetric treatments.
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Asymmetric Prior treatments
ASYM ASYM-COARSE
Abstention Switching Abstention Switching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
q -0.437*** -0.438*** -0.080 -0.086 -0.329*** -0.321*** 0.052 0.043
(0.062) (0.062) (0.078) (0.078) (0.115) (0.114) (0.148) (0.148)
Majority wrongt−1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.020** -0.017*** 0.010** 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
i wrongt−1 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.511*** 0.456*** 0.304*** 0.347*** 0.367*** 0.322***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.021) (0.023) (0.044) (0.055)
i (pivotal∧wrong)t−1 0.002 0.170*** -0.151*** 0.157***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.039) (0.050)
Constant 0.363** 0.363** 0.214* 0.219* 0.073 0.090 0.220** 0.203**
(0.115) (0.115) (0.096) (0.096) (0.089) (0.079) (0.083) (0.078)
Observations 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.205 0.212 0.145 0.155 0.144 0.151
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Simple Heuristics in asymmetric Prior treatment. Abstention and Switching re-
gressed on signal accuracy and three dummies indicating whether (i) the majority vote in
the past period was incorrect (i.e. not coinciding with the state), (ii) participant i’s vote was
incorrect and (iii) whether participant i was pivotal and incorrect.
for participants, which is why they try to use past experience to inform their decisions to
a greater extent. The fact that some of the decision is based on past experience could
also explain why participants in the asymmetric treatments do not react “enough” to signal
accuracy.
4 Further Theoretical Results
4.1 Large Elections
In this section we extend our theoretical results by focusing on elections where the number
of voters tends to inﬁnite. Our ﬁrst result is that in large elections the fraction of voters who
vote against their signal converges to zero and, moreover, the diﬀerence in behavior between
those who receive diﬀerent signals of the same quality also converges to zero.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium in a large election is either Type 1 with
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq → 0 or
Type 2 with
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0.
The ﬁrst part of the theorem states that in equilibrium of Type 1 we have
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq → 0.
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Since in such equilibrium q−R ≤ q+R , we have then that
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq → 0. Therefore, the
proportion of voters that vote against their signal converges to zero. Note that it may happen
that the number of voters who vote against their signal is bounded away from zero, that is, it
could be that limN→∞(N +1)
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq > ε for some ε > 0. However, the number of voters
voting against their signal in the population is insigniﬁcant compared with the number of
voters who vote according to their signal.
Another implication of the ﬁrst part of the theorem is that the diﬀerence in behavior
between those who receive signal B or R converges to zero. A voter who receives signal B
always votes for B while the fraction of voters who do not vote for R when they receive signal
R is
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq, which converges to zero.
The second part of the theorem states that in equilibrium of Type 2 we have
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq →
0. Again this implies that the diﬀerence in behavior between those who receive signal B or
R converges to zero. Therefore, Theorem 2 implies that when the number of voters tends
to inﬁnity the fraction of voters who vote against their signal (
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq) and the fraction
of voters whose behavior depend on the speciﬁc signal received (
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq) vanishes in the
limit. That is, as the number of voters increases the eﬀect of an asymmetric common prior
(p > 12) vanishes in the limit and the results in McMurray (2013) apply. (i.e. the equilibrium
is characterized by a cut-point q that determines who abstains and who votes for his signal
independently on the particular signal received).
The reason behind the result in Theorem 2 is the following. Assume that
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq does
not converge to zero. In this case if a voter is pivotal then it must be that in proportion more
voters received signal R than B: as
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq does not converge to zero, not all voters who
receive signal R vote for R yet all voters who receive signal B vote for B. If more voters
receive signal R than B then since the average signal quality μ is greater than 12 by law of
large numbers the state of nature is R with probability one. This implies that all voters
should vote for R, contradicting the fact that all voters who receive signal B prefer to vote
for B.
A similar argument shows that as the number of voters grows large in equilibrium of
Type 2 we must have
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0. If ∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq does not converge to zero then if a
voter is pivotal it must be that a greater proportion of voters receive signal R than signal B.
This is because a higher fraction of those voters who receive signal R compared to those who
receive signal B abstain. Law of large number then means that the state is R with probability
one, which implies that all voters should vote for R. This represents a contradiction to the
characterization of equilibrium of Type 2.
Our ﬁnal result states that in large elections the best candidate wins with probability one.
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This result is in line with the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the ﬁndings in previous literature
(see for instance Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999) and McMurray (2013)).
Proposition 1. The equilibrium in a large election is such that the best candidate wins with
probability one.
Given the result in Theorem 2, whether a voter chooses to vote or to abstain depends on
the quality of his signal, not on the value of the signal itself. Thus, for a given state of nature
and given level of abstention, the best candidate is expected to receive a share μ of the votes
while the other candidate is expected to receive a share 1− μ of the votes. Since μ > 12 law
of large numbers implies that the best candidate wins with probability one.
5 Conclusions
We presented a common value election setting where voters have private information of
diﬀerent qualities. We showed both theoretically and experimentally that voters may have
incentives to vote against their private information, even if such private information is useful,
all have the same preferences, and abstention is allowed. Moreover, we found that elections do
not generally aggregate information eﬃciently. Experimental participants used their private
information not always as predicted by Bayesian equilibrium analysis. This produced the
unexpected result that higher quality of information is not always better. We also found that
participants seem to rely on simple heuristics to a greater extent when priors are asymmetric.
Future research could build on our work and study behaviour in asymmetric prior settings
in more detail. Our research has shown that, both theoretically and empirically, there are
interesting and non-trivial diﬀerences between the asymmetric and symmetric prior cases.
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A Appendix: Proofs
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. The best response of any voter i against any strategy v played by the other N
voters is given v′, which is characterized by four cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and q
+
R in
[
1
2 , 1
]
such
that
v′(θi, qi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
B if either σi = B and qi ≥ q+B or σi = R and qi < q−R ,
R if either σi = B and qi < q
−
B or σi = R and qi ≥ q+R ,
∅ otherwise.
Proof. Take any arbitrary voter i and assume all voters except i use strategy v. Consider
equations (1), (2) and (3) and assume that σi = B. We have that both Eu(B, v)−Eu(R, v)
and Eu(B, v) − Eu(∅, v) are increasing in qi. Therefore, there exists a x ∈ [0, 1] such that
both equations are positive and voter i votes for B whenever qi ≥ x. Since qi ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
if we
deﬁne q+B = max
{
1
2 , x
}
we have that voter i votes for B whenever qi ≥ q+B .
Moreover, both Eu(R, v)−Eu(B, v) and Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) are decreasing in qi. There-
fore, there exists a y with 0 ≤ y ≤ x such that both equations are positive and voter i
votes for R whenever qi < y. If we deﬁne q
−
B = max
{
1
2 , y
}
we have that voter i votes for B
whenever qi < q
−
B .
The ﬁnal possibility is that both Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) and Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) are negative,
which can happen if and only if qi ∈ [y, x) or, in other words, qi ∈ [q−B , q+B). In this case,
voter i prefers to abstain.
A similar reasoning when σi = R leads to the conclusion in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. An Equilibrium Exists
First we demonstrate existence. Given the result in Lemma 1, we know that for any
strategy v employed by the other N voters every voter employs a strategy that is charac-
terized by four cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and q
+
R . Deﬁne the function φ :
[
1
2 , 1
]4 → [12 , 1]4 where
φ(q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R , q
+
R) is the best response of any voter to a situation where all other N voters
employ an strategy characterized the four cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R , q
+
R . We have to prove that φ
has a ﬁxed point. By the ﬁxed point theorem, since the set
[
1
2 , 1
]4
is convex and compact in
the Euclidean space we are left to show that φ is continuous.
When N voters are using strategy v characterized by the four cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and
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q+R we have that
πt(v,B) =

N2 ∑
sB(B)=0
N2 −sB(B)∑
sR(B)=0
N−2(sB(B)+sR(B))∑
sB(∅)=0
sB(B)+sR(B)∑
sB(R)=0
N !
sB(B)!sR(B)!sB(∅)!sB(R)!(sB(B) + sR(B)− sB(R))!(N − 2(sB(B) + sR(B))− sB(∅))!
×
[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]sB(B) [∫ q−R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]sR(B)
×
[∫ q+B
q−B
qf(q)dq
]sB(∅) [∫ q−B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]sB(R)
×
[∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]sB(B)+sR(B)−sB(R) [∫ q+R
q−R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2(sB(B)+sR(B))−sB(∅)
(4)
Since F (q) =
∫ q
1
2
f(q)dq we have that F is continuous and, because it is a cumulative
density function, it is bounded in [0, 1]. Therefore, F is integrable and moreover continuous
with respect to the integration limits. Thus,
∫
qf(q)d(q) = qF (q) − ∫ F (q)dq is continuous
with respect to the integration limits. As a result, πt(v,B) is continuous with respect to the
cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and q
+
R .
It can be shown in a similar fashion that πt(v, s), πR(v, s) and πB(v, s) are continuous
with respect to the cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and q
+
R for all s ∈ {B,R}. Hence, we have that
Eu(B, v)−Eu(R, v), Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) and Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) are continuous with respect
to the cutpoints q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and q
+
R . Thus, φ is continuous as we wanted to show.
Equilibrium is of Two Types
Given the result in Lemma 1, any equilibrium is characterized by the four threshold
values q−B , q
+
B , q
−
R and q
+
R . Assume that q
−
R >
1
2 , then we have that Eu(B, v)− Eu(R, v) > 0
and Eu(B, v) − Eu(∅, v) > 0 for all i with σi = R and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
−
R
)
, which implies that
Eu(B, v)−Eu(R, v) > 0 and Eu(B, v)−Eu(∅, v) > 0 for all i with σi = B and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
−
R
)
.
This means that q−B , q
+
B =
1
2 , which leads to equilibrium of Type 1 in the proposition.
Assume now that q−R =
1
2 and q
+
R >
1
2 . In this case we have that Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) < 0
for all i with σi = R and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
+
R
)
, which implies that Eu(R, v) − Eu(∅, v) < 0 for all i
with σi = B and qi ∈
[
1
2 , q
+
R
)
. This means that q−B =
1
2 , which leads to equilibrium of type 2
in the proposition.
Finally, assume that q−R = q
+
R =
1
2 . We proceed by showing that πt(v,B) + πR(v,B) ≥
πt(v,R) + πR(v,R). If this were true, and since q
+
R =
1
2 implies that Eu(R, v)−Eu(∅, v) ≥ 0
for all i with σi = R and qi ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
, equation (3) together with the fact that p ≥ 12 implies
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that πt(v,R)+πR(v,R) ≥ πt(v,B)+πR(v,B), which would represent a contradiction (unless
q−R = q
+
R = q
−
B = q
+
B = p =
1
2 , which is an equilibrium of either Type in the proposition).
First we show that πt(v,B)− πt(v,R) ≥ 0 for all 12 ≤ q−B ≤ q+B ≤ 1. Note that
πt(v,B) =

N2 ∑
j=0
j∑
r=0
N !
j!(j − r)!r!(N − 2j)![∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ q−B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]j−r [∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r [∫ q+B
q−B
qf(q)dq
]N−2j
,
πt(v,R) =

N2 ∑
j=0
j∑
r=0
N !
j!(j − r)!r!(N − 2j)![∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ q−B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j−r [∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r [∫ q+B
q−B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j
.
Given that qi ≥ 12 for all voter i we have that
πt(v,B)− πt(v,R) ≥

N2 ∑
j=0
j∑
r=0
N !
j!(j − r)!r!(N − 2j)!⎛
⎝[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r
−
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r⎞⎠ .
Thus, if q+B =
1
2 or q
+
B = 1 then πt(v,B)−πt(v,R) ≥ 0. Consider now the cases where q+B ∈(
1
2 , 1
)
. Using once more that qi ≥ 12 for all i, a necessary condition for πt(v,B)−πt(v,R) ≥ 0
is that[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]r [∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r
≥
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]r [∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r
.
This can be written as[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
][∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]
≥
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
][∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq +
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]
.
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In other words,
∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
≥
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
,
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
.
Since it is true that ∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
q+Bf(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
q+Bf(q)dq
=
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
,
we have that πt(v,B)− πt(v,R) ≥ 0.
Proceeding in a similar fashion, it can be shown that πR(v,B)− πR(v,R) ≥ 0. Thus, we
have that πt(v,B)− πR(v,B) ≥ πi(v,R)− πR(v,R) as required.
In Equilibrium of Type 1 q−R ≤ p
We can use the algebra from the previous part of the proof to show that in equilibrium of
Type 1 πt(v,B)− πt(v,R) ≤ 0 and πB(v,R)− πB(v,B) ≥ 0 for all 12 ≤ q−R ≤ q+R ≤ 1. Hence,
equation (2) together with the deﬁnition of q−R implies p(1− q−R) ≥ (1− p)q−R , which in turn
implies q−R ≤ p.
In Equilibrium of Type 2 q+R ≥ q+B
Next we prove that in any equilibrium of type 2 it must be that q+R ≥ q+B . Assume the
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opposite, q+B > q
+
R . Note that in any Type 2 equilibrium we have that
πt(v,B) =

N2 ∑
j=0
[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j
×
N−2j∑
r=0
N !
j!j!r!(N − 2j − r)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]r [∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j−r
.
Thus, it is true that
πt(v,B) =

N2 ∑
j=0
[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j
×

N−2j2 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
×
⎛
⎝[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j−2k
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j−2k⎞⎠ , (5)
πt(v,R) =

N2 ∑
j=0
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j
×

N−2j2 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
×
⎛
⎝[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j−2k
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j−2k⎞⎠ . (6)
We now show that πt(v,B) − πt(v,R) ≥ 0 in three steps. First, we have that q+B > q+R
implies
[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j
≥
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j
(7)
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for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . .} if and only if
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q+B
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]
≥
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq +
∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
]
.
which can be rewritten as∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
∫ q+B
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq ≥
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq,
∫ q+B
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
,
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq
,
which given that ∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+B
q+Bf(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
q+Bf(q)dq
,
=
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq
,
proves that equation (7) holds true when q+B > q
+
R .
Second, we have that q+B > q
+
R implies[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
≥
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
(8)
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for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . .} if and only if
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
≥
∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
,
∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ q+B
1
2
f(q)dq
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
,
∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
,
which given that
∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
≥
∫ q+B
q+R
q+Rf(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
q+Rf(q)dq
,
=
∫ q+B
q+R
f(q)dq∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq
,
proves that equation (8) holds true when q+B > q
+
R .
Third, we have that q+B > q
+
R implies[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
≥
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m
(9)
for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . .} if and only if[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq +
∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
]m
−
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m
≥
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q+B
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
−
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m
which is always true for m = 0 and true for m ∈ {1, 2, . . .} if and only if
m∑
l=1
(
m
l
)[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]m−l [∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
]l
≥
m∑
l=1
(
m
l
)[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]m−l [∫ q+B
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]l
.
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Since the expression above is true we have that q+B > q
+
R implies equation (9) as required.
Therefore, we have shown that q+B > q
+
R implies equations (7), (8) and (9) are true. Hence,
from equations (5) and (6) we have that q+B > q
+
R implies πt(v,B)− πt(v,R) ≥ 0.
Equations (2) and (3) together with the fact that q+B > q
+
R and p ≥ 12 imply that
q+B (πt(v,B) + πB(v,B)) ≤ (1− q+B) (πt(v,R) + πB(v,R)) ,
q+B (πt(v,R) + πR(v,R)) > (1− q+B) (πt(v,B) + πR(v,B)) .
Given that, as we have just shown, q+B > q
+
R implies πt(v,B) − πt(v,R) ≥ 0, the two
expressions above imply
(1− q+B) (πB(v,R)− πR(v,B)) > q+B (πB(v,B)− πR(v,R)) . (10)
Note now that
πR(v,B) =
N2 ∑
j=1
[∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
]j [∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j−1
×

N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j + 1− k)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
×
⎛
⎝[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k⎞⎠ ,
πB(v,R) =
N2 ∑
j=1
[∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
]j−1 [∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
]j
×

N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j + 1− k)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
×
⎛
⎝[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k⎞⎠ ,
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and similarly for πB(v,B) and πR(v,R). Deﬁne
KB =

N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k + 1)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k
×
⎛
⎝[∫ q+B
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k⎞⎠ ,
KR =

N−2j+12 ∑
k=0
N !
j!j!k!(N − 2j − k + 1)!
×
[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]k [∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]k
×
⎛
⎝[∫ q+B
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k
+
[∫ q+R
1
2
qf(q)dq
]N−2j+1−2k⎞⎠ .
Then, equations (8) and (9) imply KB ≥ KR. Moreover, as q+B > q+R implies equation (7),
we have that
(1− q+B) (πB(v,R)− πR(v,B)) ≤ (1− q+B)
(∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
)
KR,
q+B (πB(v,B)− πR(v,R)) ≥ q+B
(∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
KB.
This means that equation (10) holds only if
(1− q+B)
(∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
)
KR ≥ q+B
(∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
KB,
(1− q+B)
(∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
)
≥ q+B
(∫ q+B
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
,
(∫ q+B
q+R
qf(q)dq
)
≥
(∫ q+B
q+R
q+Bf(q)dq
)
,
holds. However, given that q+B > q
+
R the expression above is false. This leads to a contradic-
tion, which means that the claim q+B > q
+
R is false as required.
The following Lemma from Feddersen and Pessendorfer (1996) is used in the proof of the
Theorem 2.
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Lemma 2 (Lemma 0 in Feddersen and Pessendorfer (1996)). Let (aN , bN , cN )
∞
N=1 a sequence
that satisﬁes (aN , bN , cN ) ∈ [0, 1]3 and aN < bN − δ and δ < cN for all N and some δ > 0.
Then, for i = 0, 1 as N → ∞∑N
2
−i
j=0
N !
(j+i)!j!(N−2j−i)!c
N−2j−i
N a
j
N∑N
2
−i
j=0
N !
(j+i)!j!(N−2j−i)!c
N−2j−i
N b
j
N
→ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Equilibrium of Type 1
Deﬁne γxy as the proportion of voters who vote for x ∈ {B,R, ∅} when the state is
y ∈ {B,R}.
First we show that as N → ∞ the equilibrium of Type 1 is such that ∫ q+R1
2
f(q)dq → 0.
Assume for now that there exists a ρ > 0 such that
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq > ρ for all N and consider an
equilibrium of Type 1 and assume that there exists a ε > 0 such that either
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε or∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq ≥ ε for all N . We have that there exists a δ1 > 0 such that γRRγBR−δ1 > γBBγRB
if and only if ∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
(∫ 1
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q−R
1
2
qf(q)dq
)
− δ1 >
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
(∫ 1
1
2
qf(q)dq +
∫ q−R
1
2
(1− q)f(q)dq
)
,
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
(∫ 1
q−R
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq
)
− δ1 >
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
(∫ 1
q−R
qf(q)dq +
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq
)
,
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
(∫ q+R
q−R
(1− q)f(q)dq +
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq
)
− δ1 >
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq
(∫ q+R
q−R
qf(q)dq +
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq
)
.
B necessary condition for this is∫ 1
q+R
(q − q+R)f(q)dq
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq +
∫ 1
q+R
(2q − 1)f(q)dq
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,
∫ 1
q+R
(q − q+R)f(q)dq
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq + (2q−R − 1)
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0.
By assumption
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq > ρ for some ρ > 0. Therefore, if
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε then
q−R ≥ F−1(ε) and the expression above is true for any δ1 ∈ (0, (2F−1(ε)− 1)ρε).9
9F−1 exists because f is integrable and, hence, F is continuous.
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Assume
∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq < ε, which implies that
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq ≥ ε. Note that ∫ 1q+R f(q)dq > ρ for
some ρ > 0 implies that for all ρ¯ ∈ (0, ρ) there exists a β > 0 such that ∫ 1q+R+β f(q)dq > ρ¯,
ﬁx such ρ and consider its corresponding β. Thus, a necessary condition for γRRγBR − δ1 >
γBBγRB is ∫ 1
q+R
(q − q+R)f(q)dq
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,
∫ 1
q+R+β
βf(q)dq
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,
βρ¯
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq − δ1 > 0,
βρ¯ε− δ1 > 0.
Hence, for any δ1 ∈ (0,min{(2F−1(ε)−1)ρε, βρ¯ε}) we have that γRRγBR− δ1 > γBBγRB.
If
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq < ε for all ε > 0 then γ∅s → 0. Since γRRγBR − δ1 > γBBγRB implies
lim
N→∞
(γBBγRB)
N
2
−i
(γRRγBR)
N
2
−i → 0
for i = 0, 1, we have πt(v,B)πt(v,R) → 0 and, if
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq = 0, also that πB(v,B)πB(v,R) → 0 and
πR(v,B)
πR(v,R)
→ 0.
If
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq = 0 then πB(v,B) = πB(v,R) = πR(v,B) = πR(v,R) = 0.
On the other hand, if
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq ≥ ε then there exists a δ2 > 0 such that γ∅s > δ2. Deﬁne
δ = min {δ1, δ2}. By Lemma 2 we have that as N grows large πt(v,B)πt(v,R) → 0,
πB(v,B)
πB(v,R)
→ 0 and
πR(v,B)
πR(v,R)
→ 0.
Therefore, equations (2) and (3) then imply q−R → 12 and q+R → 12 which in turn implies∫ q−R
1
2
f(q)dq → 0 and ∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq → 0, which contradicts the fact that either ∫ q−R1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε
or
∫ q+R
q−R
f(q)dq ≥ ε for a ﬁxed ε.
Assume now that for all ρ > 0 there exists an N¯ such that for all N ≥ N¯ , we have∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ. Fix a ρ ∈ (0, 12) and the corresponding N¯ . This means that at most a
fraction ρ of voters vote for R for any N ≥ N¯ . In equilibrium of Type 1, q+B = 12 and all
voters who receive signal B vote for B. Hence, if a voter is pivotal it must be that at most
a fraction ρ of voters plus one received signal B. Since ρ can be chosen as small as desired
and N as large as desired, we have that if a voter is pivotal then the fraction of voters who
received signal B is negligible compared to the fraction of voters who received signal R and,
hence, the probability that the state of nature is R converges to one when a voter is pivotal
by law of large numbers. By equation (3) this implies q+R → 12 which contradicts the fact that∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ.
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Equilibrium of Type 2
We prove next that in an equilibrium of Type 2 we must have
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0. Assume
for now that there exists a ρ > 0 such that
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq > ρ for all N . Consider an equilibrium
of Type 2 and suppose there exists a ε > 0 such that
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq ≥ ε for all N . We have that
a necessary condition for there to be a δ1 > 0 such that γRRγBR − δ1 > γBBγRB is∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq − δ1 >
∫ 1
q+B
(1− q)f(q)dq
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq,
∫ 1
q+B
qf(q)dq
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq − δ1 >
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq,
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq − δ1 >
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq
∫ q+R
q+B
qf(q)dq,
∫ 1
q+R
(q − q+R)f(q)dq
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq > δ1.
Since
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq > ρ for some ρ > 0 then for all ρ¯ ∈ (0, ρ) there exists a β > 0 such
that
∫ 1
q+R+β
f(q)dq > ρ¯, ﬁx such ρ and consider its corresponding β. Moreover, by assumption∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq ≥ ε. Thus, if we choose any δ1 ∈ (0, βρˆε) then γRRγBR − δ1 > γBBγRB.
Given that
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq ≥ ε it is true that ∫ q+R1
2
f(q)dq ≥ ε and, hence, there exists a δ2 > 0
such that γ∅s > δ2. Deﬁne δ = min {δ1, δ2}. Then by Lemma 2 we have then that as N grows
large πt(v,B)πt(v,R) → 0,
πB(v,B)
πB(v,R)
→ 0 and πR(v,B)πR(v,R) → 0. Equations (2) and (3) then imply q
+
R → 12
which in turn implies
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0, this contradicts the fact that ∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq > ε for a
ﬁxed ε.
Assume now that for all ρ > 0 there exists an N¯ such that for all N ≥ N¯ , we have∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ. Fix a ρ ∈ (0, 12) and the corresponding N¯ . This means that at most a
fraction ρ of voters vote for R for any N ≥ N¯ . In equilibrium of Type 2, q−R = 12 and we
have two possibilities. If for all ρ > 0 there exists an N such that for all N ≥ N¯ we have∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ, then ∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq ≤ ρ which is what the result in the Theorem states. If,
on the other hand, there exists a ε > 0 such that
∫ 1
q+B
f(q)dq ≥ ε for all N , then at least a
fraction ε of voters who receive signal B vote for B. If a voter is pivotal, it must be because
at most a fraction ρ of voters plus one receive signal B. However, since ρ can be chosen as
small as desired and N + 1 as large as desired, the fraction of voters who receive signal B
must be arbitrarily small as otherwise a fraction ε of them vote for B against the fraction
ρ that vote for R and the voter is not pivotal. Therefore, the probability that the state of
nature is R converges to one when a voter is pivotal by law of large numbers. By equation
(3) this implies q+R → 12 which contradicts the fact that
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Using the proof of Theorem 2 we have that either
∫ q+R
1
2
f(q)dq → 0 or∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0. Assume ﬁrst that ∫ q+R1
2
f(q)dq → 0. In this case almost all voters vote for
the candidate that coincides with their signal (for all δ > 0 there exists a N for which the
proportion of voters who do not is smaller than δ). Therefore, by law of large numbers the
proportion of voters who vote for the candidate that coincides with the state of nature is μ
while the proportion of voters who vote for the other candidate is 1−μ. Since μ > 12 implies
that there exists a ε > 0 such that μ−ε > 12 , we have that most voters vote for the candidate
that coincides with the state of nature which gives the desired result.
Assume now
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0. In this case all voters who do not abstain vote for the
candidate that coincides with their signal and, furthermore, the decision on whether to vote
or not is independent on the signal received (for all δ > 0 there exists a N for which the
number of voters choose whether to abstain or not depending on their signal is smaller than
δ). Therefore, by law of large numbers the proportion of voters who vote for the candidate
that coincides with the state of nature is (N + 1)
∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq while the proportion of voters
who vote for the other candidate is (N + 1)
∫ 1
q+R
(1 − q)f(q)dq. If there exists a ρ > 0 such
that
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq > ρ for all N + 1 then for all ρ¯ ∈ (0, ρ) there exists a β > 0 such that∫ 1
q+R+β
f(q)dq > ρ¯ we have∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq −
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq =
∫ 1
q+R
(2q − 1)f(q)dq
≥
∫ 1
q+R+β
(2q − 1)f(q)dq
≥ 2β
∫ 1
q+R+β
f(q)dq
> 2βρ¯.
Thus, most voters vote for the candidate that coincides with the state of nature as we wanted
to show.
Consider now the case where for all ρ > 0 there exists a N¯ such that
∫ 1
q+R
f(q)dq ≤ ρ for
all n > N¯ . By monotonicity of F and the fact that
∫ q+R
q+B
f(q)dq → 0 we have q+B → q+R → 1.
Moreover,
lim
q+R→1
γBR
γRR
= lim
q+R→1
∫ 1
q+R
(1− q)f(q)dq∫ 1
q+R
qf(q)dq
,
= lim
q+R→1
(1− q+R)f(q+R)
q+Rf(q
+
R)
,
= lim
q+R→1
1
q+R
− 1,
= 0,
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and similarly limq+B→1
γRB
γBB
= 0, where we have used L’Hoˆpital’s rule for computing the limit
above. That is, the probability that a random voter votes for the candidate that does not
match the state of nature is insigniﬁcant compared to the probability that a random voter
votes for the candidate that does, which implies P (V = S) → 1.
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B Appendix: Experimental Instructions
Welcome! You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. If you follow
the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then
we will come to your seat and answer your questions. Any violation of this rule excludes you
immediately from the experiment and all payments.
For your participation you will receive a show-up fee 3 pounds. You can earn additional
amounts of money. Below we will describe how. All your decisions will be treated conﬁden-
tially both during the experiment and after the experiment. This means that none of the
other participants will know which decisions you made.
Experimental Instructions The experiment will last for 30 rounds. In each round you
will be matched randomly in groups of four participants. Remember that the groups change
in each round, so the participants you play with in one round are most likely diﬀerent from
those you played with the round before. At the beginning of each round of the experiment
the computer randomly draws one of two colours RED or BLUE. We call the colour that was
drawn “the state”. BLUE is much more likely than RED to be drawn. In particular there
is a 95% chance that BLUE is drawn and only a 5% chance that RED is drawn. Remember
that the state is drawn anew in each round, i.e. it can be diﬀerent in each round. The state
is the same, though, for all group members in each round.
Figure 6: The state is BLUE with a 95% chance, i.e. a chance of 95 in 100.
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Goal of the experiment: You will be asked to guess whether the state is RED or BLUE.
Your goal is to guess correctly as a group. Hence it will not matter whether you guess
correctly yourself. The only thing that matters is whether the majority of your group guesses
correctly. We will explain now what additional information each group member gets before
making a guess, what guesses you can make and how your payments are computed.
Information you receive: Each group member receives a “signal” about whether the
state is BLUE or RED before they submit their guess. A signal is a ball drawn randomly
from a box containing RED and BLUE balls. All balls in a box are equally likely to be drawn.
There are however, two boxes for each player and you don’t know which one the ball is
drawn from. If the state is BLUE the ball will be drawn from your BLUE box. (Remember
that this is the case with a 95% chance). If the state is RED, the ball will be drawn from
your RED box. (This is the case with a 5% chance). Hence if you knew the box you would
know the state. This is true for all participants.
There are always at least as many BLUE balls in your BLUE box as there are in your
RED box. Hence, if both boxes were equally likely, a BLUE ball is more likely to come from
a BLUE box and a RED ball is more likely to come from a RED box.
How much more likely will depend on the exact composition of the boxes. In each round
you will be shown the composition of your boxes. You will also be shown the colour of the
ball drawn.
It is important to note that the composition of boxes can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent group
members. In particular, for each participant, the number of BLUE balls in their BLUE box is
randomly drawn from anything between half the balls being BLUE to all balls being BLUE.
The number of RED balls in a participant’s RED box always equals the number of BLUE
balls in their BLUE box10
Things to remember about signals:
• You will see a ball drawn from either your RED or your BLUE box.
• If the state is BLUE the ball will be drawn from the BLUE box. If the state is RED it
will be drawn from the RED box.
10In ASYM-COARSE and SYM-COARSE the version of this paragraph reads “It is important to note
that the composition of boxes can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent group members. In particular, for each participant,
the number of BLUE balls in their BLUE box is randomly drawn from anything between half the balls being
BLUE to three quarters of the balls being BLUE. The number of RED balls in a participant’s RED box always
equals the number of BLUE balls in their BLUE box”
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• You will also see how many RED and BLUE balls your RED and BLUE boxes contain.
• All other group members will also see a ball drawn from one of their boxes.
• Remember, though, that their boxes can have a diﬀerent composition.
• Boxes change in each round for each participant.
Making a guess: After all group members have received their signals, all will make a guess
simultaneously. You have three options. You either guess RED, BLUE or you can ABSTAIN.
Remember that the goal is to guess correctly as a group.
Your payment: Apart from the show up fee you receive, one round is drawn for payment
and you receive
• 10 additional pounds if the group guesses correctly in that round and
• 2 additional pounds if the group is not correct in that round.
When is the group correct? The group is correct if the majority of group members who
do not abstain indicate the correct state.
Hence, if the state is BLUE then the group is correct if
• at least 3 group members vote BLUE,
• at least 2 group members vote BLUE and at least one abstains,
• at least 1 group member votes BLUE and all others abstain.
Similarly, if the state is RED then the group is correct if
• at least 3 group members vote RED,
• at least 2 group members vote RED and at least one abstains,
• at least 1 group member votes RED and all others abstain.
If the same number of group members vote RED and BLUE, then there is a tie and
whether the group’s guess is considered correct is determined by the ﬂip of a coin.
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Control Questions: Are the following statements TRUE or FALSE? If you have any
questions please raise your hand.
1. My group members change from round to round.
2. All group members receive a ball from the same box.
3. The composition of the box of my group members can be diﬀerent from the composition
of my box.
4. If I vote RED, one group member abstains and two vote BLUE, I receive 2 pounds if
the state is RED and 10 pounds if the state is BLUE.
5. If I vote BLUE, one group member abstains and two vote BLUE, I receive 2 pounds if
the state is RED and 10 pounds if the state is BLUE.
6. Only one round is randomly drawn for payment.
ENJOY THE EXPERIMENT !!
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C Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
This Appendix collects additional tables and ﬁgures. Figure 7 shows a screenshot of how the
signal and signal accuracy were communicated during the experiment.
Figure 7: Screenshot of how the signal drawn was communicated.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RED signal BLUE signal
SYM SYM-COARSE ASYM ASYM SYM SYM-COARSE ASYM ASYM
COARSE COARSE
Vote
with signal
Abstain
q -8.640*** -5.034*** 6.130*** 2.629* -9.251*** -9.946*** -4.854*** -3.344**
(0.863) (1.839) (0.976) (1.958) (0.968) (1.532) (1.060) (1.474)
Constant 4.754*** 1.505 -2.865*** -5.082*** 4.687*** 3.936*** 0.561 -0.098
(0.552) (1.082) (0.663) (1.816) (0.591) (0.913) (0.704) (0.913)
Vote
against signal
q -1.634** -1.093 -0.382 1.159 -3.677*** -9.917*** -3.020* -3.357
(0.719) (1.360) (0.905) (1.816) (0.995) (1.819) (1.690) (3.563)
Constant 0.076 -0.091 -0.541 -1.936* 0.487 3.524*** -1.715 -1.957
(0.523) (0.831) (0.582) (1.074) (0.673) (1.080) (1.173) (2.202)
Observations 739 719 471 350 701 721 969 970
Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Multinomial logit regression on voting outcomes categorized as “voting with the
signal”, “abstaining” or “voting against the signal”.
Table 8 addresses the potential concern in the asymmetric treatments, that the frequency
of receiving RED signals is low making learning diﬃcult. Empirically this frequency ranges
between 16− 53% in the asymmetric treatments. Table 8 linearly controls for the frequency
with which a RED signal was seen by a participant and shows that results are qualitatively
robust.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RED signal BLUE signal
SYM SYM-COARSE ASYM ASYM SYM SYM-COARSE ASYM ASYM
COARSE COARSE
Vote
with signal
Abstain
q -8.641*** -4.797*** 5.076*** 2.627*** -9.203*** -9.995*** -5.675*** -3.403**
(0.863) (1.853) (1.948) (0.976) (0.971) (1.532) (1.060) (1.479)
Constant 4.575*** 2.616** -6.239*** -2.763*** 6.106*** 4.053*** -2.722*** 0.954
(0.785) (1.226) (1.347) (1.816) (0.823) (1.009) (0.909) (0.962)
Vote
against signal
q -1.632** -1.170 -0.351 1.158 -3.686*** -9.879*** -3.091* -3.352
(0.720) (1.360) (0.905) (1.827) (0.996) (1.820) (1.699) (3.563)
Constant -0.083 -0.470 -1.611** -1.615* 0.075 3.139*** -2.066 -0.157
(0.737) (0.944) (0.757) (1.201) (0.982) (1.201) (1.415) (2.275)
Observations 739 719 471 350 701 721 969 970
Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Multinomial logit regression on voting outcomes categorized as “voting with the
signal”, “abstaining” or “voting against the signal” including linear controls for the frequency
with which participants saw a red signal across the 30 rounds.
yit = αi + β0qit + β1SYM-COARSE+ β2ASYM+ β3ASYM-COARSE (11)
+ β10 ∗ (qit ∗ASYM) + β20 ∗ (qit ∗ASYM) + β30 ∗ (qit ∗ASYM-COARSE) + it
Table 9 shows the results of running regression (11) in our sample using as binary outcome
yit whether or not a participant i voted against her signal in period t. Columns (1) and
(2) include the whole sample, columns (3) and (4) only the second half of the experiment
after potentially some learning has occurred. Columns (1) and (3) focus on participants
who received a RED signal. The estimates show that in the baseline (treatment SYM)
participants rarely vote against their signal. They do so more often in ASYM and ASYM-
COARSE if the signal is RED, i.e. goes against the prior and less often if it is BLUE, i.e.
consistent with the prior. Interestingly, in SYM-COARSE they tend to vote more often
against a BLUE signal compared to SYM. Signal accuracy decreases the propensity to vote
against the signal across all treatments, albeit not always signiﬁcantly so.
Table 10 shows the results of running regression (11) in our sample using as binary out-
come yit whether or not a participant i abstained in period t. Irrespective of the signal,
participants abstain less often in SYM-COARSE, ASYM and ASYM-COARSE com-
pared to SYM. An increased signal accuracy decreases the propensity to abstain in SYM and
to a lesser extent in SYM-COARSE, but not in ASYM and ASYM-COARSE, where
especially with RED signals participants decide to abstain rather than voting against the
signal.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vote against signal if it is: RED BLUE RED 15-30 BLUE 15-30
q 0.129 -0.119** 0.120 -0.021
(0.102) (0.0509) (0.128) (0.0705)
SYM-COARSE 0.212 0.248*** 0.099 0.219**
(0.167) (0.067) (0.215) (0.088)
ASYM 0.550*** -0.117** 0.794*** -0.0689
(0.132) (0.052) (0.160) (0.069)
ASYM-COARSE 1.041*** -0.123* 0.858*** -0.075
(0.187) (0.068) (0.236) (0.089)
SYM-COARSE×q -0.188 -0.449*** 0.0312 -0.423***
(0.255) (0.101) (0.328) (0.134)
ASYM×q -0.254 0.0680 -0.514** -0.024
(0.181) (0.068) (0.219) (0.093)
ASYM-COARSE×q -0.962*** 0.060 -0.562 -0.021
(0.296) (0.102) (0.378) (0.135)
Constant 0.097 0.175*** 0.076 0.114**
(0.081) (0.037) (0.101) (0.050)
Observations 1,979 3,661 1,052 1,768
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Random Eﬀects OLS regressions: Voting against one’s signal when it indicates the
low prior (column (1)) or high prior (column (2)) state. Columns (3) and (4) only consider
data from the last 15 periods.
Table 11 corresponds to Table 4 in the main text, but includes linear time trends (and
treatment interactions).
Table 12 corresponds to Table 6 in the main text, but linearly controls for the frequency
with which a RED signal was seen by a participant and shows that results are qualitatively
robust.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abstain if signal is RED BLUE RED 15-30 BLUE 15-30
q -1.195*** -1.142*** -1.292*** -1.187***
(0.0879) (0.068) (0.120) (0.096)
SYM-COARSE -0.601*** -0.374*** -0.414** -0.349***
(0.145) (0.093) (0.201) (0.124)
ASYM -0.633*** -0.706*** -0.892*** -0.805***
(0.115) (0.072) (0.149) (0.098)
ASYM-COARSE -0.944*** -0.705*** -0.936*** -0.857***
(0.162) (0.093) (0.221) (0.125)
SYM-COARSE×q 0.672*** 0.329** 0.359 0.271
(0.220) (0.135) (0.307) (0.183)
ASYM×q 0.919*** 0.849*** 1.330*** 0.921***
(0.157) (0.091) (0.205) (0.128)
ASYM-COARSE×q 1.332*** 0.856*** 1.288*** 1.066***
(0.255) (0.136) (0.354) (0.185)
Constant 1.058*** 0.982*** 1.142*** 1.031***
(0.070) (0.052) (0.094) (0.071)
Observations 1,979 3,661 1,052 1,768
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Random Eﬀects OLS regressions: Abstaining when the signal indicates the low
prior (column (1)) or high prior (column (2)) state. Columns (3) and (4) only consider data
from the last 15 periods.
52
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All periods periods 1-5 periods 26-30
period 0.003*** -0.079*** 0.027
(0.001) (0.016) (0.024)
SYM-COARSE(β1) -0.076** -0.404*** 1.117***
(0.037) (0.086) (0.384)
ASYM(β2) 0.342*** 0.100 -0.600***
(0.022) (0.069) (0.231)
ASYM-COARSE(β3) 0.180** 0.056 1.328**
(0.075) (0.067) (0.540)
SYM-COARSE×period (γ1) -0.007*** 0.079*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.016) (0.008)
ASYM×period (γ2) 0.001 0.040 -0.040**
(0.003) (0.025) (0.019)
ASYM-COARSE×period (γ3) -0.002 0.121*** -0.043***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.013)
Constant 0.649*** 0.850*** 0.012
(0.013) (0.058) (0.700)
β2 − β3 0.162** 0.044 -1.928***
p-value 0.0464 0.3657 <0.0001
γ2 − γ3 -0.001*** -0.081** -0.083***
p-value 0.0006 0.0272 <0.0001
Observations 5,640 940 940
Number of id 188 188 188
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Random eﬀects OLS regression of eﬃciency on treatment dummies including linear
time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the matching group level.
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Asymmetric Prior treatments
ASYM ASYM-COARSE
Abstention Switching Abstention Switching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
q -0.423*** -0.423*** -0.071 -0.078 -0.344** -0.335** 0.072 0.064
(0.102) (0.101) (0.095) (0.088) (0.120) (0.113) (0.149) (0.151)
Majority wrongt−1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019** -0.017** 0.009 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
i wrongt−1 0.064*** 0.063* 0.497*** 0.443*** 0.303*** 0.345*** 0.369*** 0.326***
(0.015) (0.031) (0.065) (0.074) (0.070) (0.080) (0.041) (0.053)
i (pivotal∧wrong)t−1 0.002 0.170** -0.148* 0.152*
(0.050) (0.043) (0.059) (0.071)
Frequency RED signals 0.687* 0.687* 0.409* 0.409* -0.236 -0.224 0.339 0.327
(0.322) (0.322) (0.176) (0.176) (0.285) (0.272) (0.339) (0.345)
Constant 0.135 0.136 0.078 0.084 0.153 0.165 0.106 0.093
(0.086) (0.086) (0.110) (0.107) (0.134) (0.120) (0.165) (0.164)
Observations 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.211 0.217 0.149 0.158 0.149 0.155
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Simple Heuristics in asymmetric Prior treatment with linear controls for the fre-
quency with which a red signal was observed across the 30 rounds. Abstention and Switching
regressed on signal accuracy and three dummies indicating whether (i) the majority vote in
the past period was incorrect (i.e. not coinciding with the state), (ii) participant i’s vote was
incorrect and (iii) whether participant i was pivotal and incorrect.
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